1. ODPP file management

I recommend that the DPP initiate reviews of the training in file management given to lawyers employed by the ODPP to ensure important original documents are not discarded and that the files accurately reflect relevant events.

2. Guidelines for when to arrest

I recommend that the Commissioner of Police issue guidelines to assist officers determine when they should exercise their powers of arrest and take an accused into custody rather than proceeding by way of a court attendance notice.

3. Access to criminal histories

I recommend that the Law, Crime and Community Safety Council develop a mechanism to ensure that all information on criminal history (including bail) that is relevant to the investigation and prosecution of criminal offences is readily accessible to police and prosecutors across all Australian jurisdictions.

4. Policy concerning bail concessions

I recommend that the DPP develop a policy for overseeing lawyers' exercise of the discretion not to oppose bail that takes into account the seriousness of the offences involved; the experience of the prosecutor appearing; and the views of the police officer in charge of the investigation, insofar as those views are based on facts relevant to bail determinations.

5. Review of TOU MOGs

???I recommend that the NSWPF review the Management Operational Guidelines to resolve any inconsistency between them and relevant counterterrorism protocols.

6. Review of logging systems

The development (recommended in Chapter 12) of an integrated intelligence system that allows police officers secure access to all information platforms should also provide for the recording of all command decisions, the reasons for them, and the dissemination of those decisions.

7. Documenting changes to line command

I recommend that the NSWPF remedy the lack of detailed guidance on how State Protection Group officers should interact and communicate with the Police Forward Commander, and that such guidance be included in policy documents and reinforced with training.

8. Police Forward Commander's scope of responsibility

I recommend that the NSWPF review the division of tasks among the various officers responsible for responding to major high-risk situations to enable Police Forward Commanders to focus exclusively on their primary goals and that officers engaged in matters not directly related to the resolution of the incident be required to report to an officer other than the Police Forward Commander.

9. Transfer of 000 calls

I recommend that the NSWPF establish procedures and the technical capability to ensure that phone calls from hostages in sieges or the victims of other ongoing high-risk situations are expeditiously transferred to officers involved in responding to the incident.

10. Integrated intelligence platform

I recommend that the NSWPF investigate the development of an integrated intelligence system that allows selected officers secure access to all information platforms and to record and share operational decisions.

11. Pro forma debriefing sheets

I recommend that the NSWPF consider developing a pro forma debriefing sheet containing standard questions relevant to all or most high risk situations, which can be supplemented by the negotiation coordinator and the tactical commander to maximise the likelihood of all available relevant information being obtained during hostage debriefings. Such measures would also aid contemporaneous documentation of information derived from debriefs and assist in relaying all relevant information to command.

12. Acquisition of audio surveillance technology

I recommend that if it has not already done so, the NSWPF acquires the audio surveillance technology that in similar circumstances would allow a device to be monitored in the Police Forward Command Post and/or the Police Operations Centre and that the organisation ensures that its capacity in this regard keeps pace with technological advances in the area.

13. Audio and video surveillance

I recommend that the NSWPF review its personnel arrangements and structures for the monitoring of surveillance devices, including the number of officers allocated to a listening or viewing post for monitoring purposes, and the demarcation of roles, including primary monitor, scribe/log keeper, and disseminator. I also recommend that clear communication channels be established for reporting data captured during such surveillance, including via integrated electronic intelligence-sharing platforms or applications.

14. Concessions to terrorists

I recommend that the Secretariat of the Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee prepare guidelines regarding the interpretation and scope of the restrictions contained Clause 92 of the NCTP 2012. The Secretariat should also update relevant Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee documents and the NSWPF should update State Protection Group documents to refer to the latest versions of the National Counter-Terrorism Plan.

15. Negotiator training

The sections above dealing with negotiators' attempts to engage with Monis, their responses to his demands, and their assessment of progress demonstrate deficiencies in current practice. To respond to those deficiencies, I recommend that the NSWPF conduct a general review of the training afforded to negotiators and the means by which they are assessed and accredited. Specifically, the review should consider the training provided regarding:

??? measuring progress in negotiations;

??? recording of information, including the systems by which that occurs;

??? the use of third-party intermediaries;

??? additional approaches to securing direct contact with a person of interest; and

??? handovers.

The NSWPF should consider drawing on international experience when reviewing its negotiator training.

16. Role description for psychological advisers

I recommend that the NSWPF develop a comprehensive policy that describes the role and function of a psychological adviser engaged to assist in responses to high-risk situations and that all those involved be made familiar with that policy.

17. Expanded panel of experts

I recommend that the NSWPF consider expanding the panel of psychological advisers it retains and the range of disciplines it consults.

18. Review of negotiation team handovers

I recommend that the NSWPF review its procedures to ensure that handovers between negotiation teams are staggered so that a fully briefed officer is always available to receive a call from the stronghold.

19. Review of Negotiation Unit staff numbers and profile

I recommend that the NSWPF review the number, rank and function of the officers comprising the Negotiation Unit.

20. Rank of negotiators

I recommend that the NSWPF review its policy of requiring negotiators to relinquish that role when they are promoted to commissioned officer rank.

21. Specialist training for terrorist negotiations

I recommend that the NSWPF develop a cadre of counterterrorist negotiators and provide them with appropriate training to equip them to respond to a terrorist siege.

22. Recording of negotiation positions

I recommend that the NSWPF develop policies that require the recording of negotiation strategies and tactics, demands made by a hostage taker, and any progress towards resolution (or lack thereof) in a form readily accessible by commanders and negotiators.

23. Review of media publication of terrorist incidents

I recommend that the Commissioner of Police consider seeking an agreement with news media outlets whereby the NSWPF will establish a way for such outlets to rapidly and confidentially determine whether publishing specific material could compromise the response to an ongoing high-risk incident and the media in turn will agree not to publish such material without first alerting a nominated senior police officer of their intention to do so.

24. Use of force in terrorist incidents

I recommend that the Minister for Police consider whether the provisions of the Terrorism (Police Powers) Act 2002 should be amended to ensure that police officers have sufficient legal protection to respond to terrorist incidents in a manner most likely to minimise the risk to members of the public.

25. A sniper coordinator in the PFCP

???I recommend that the NSWPF review its policies to ensure that the usual arrangements for placing a sniper coordinator in the Police Forward Command Post are departed from only for sound operational reasons that are recorded.

26. Recording EA triggers

I recommend that NSWPF policies be amended to require documentation of triggers for Emergency Actions. Consideration should be given to stipulating that "contingency triggers"???specific events that will require initiation of an EA or some other agreed response???should also be recorded.

27. Assessing imminent and immediate risk

I recommend that the Australia New Zealand Policing Advisory Agency and the Australia- New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee review the Australia-New Zealand Guidelines for Deployment of Police to High-Risk Situations and the Police Tactical Group Operations Manual to ensure that those documents give commanders guidance on how to assess imminent or immediate risk.

28. Reform of guidelines to DA planning

I recommend that the Australia New Zealand Policing Advisory Agency and the Australia- New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee review the Australia New Zealand Guidelines for Deployment of Police to High Risk Situations and the Police Tactical Group Operations Manual to ensure that they adequately describe all aspects of the DA planning and approval process and present commanders with appropriate guidance on relevant considerations.

29. Review of training for DA planning and approval

I recommend that the NSWPF review the training provided to officers in relation to DA planning and approval.

30. Reconsideration of response to terrorist incidents

I recommend that the Australia New Zealand Policing Advisory Agency liaise with the Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee to determine whether policies requiring the consideration of more proactive intervention should be developed for responding to terrorist sieges.

31. Use of distraction devices

I recommend that the NSWPF develop a policy regarding the use of distraction devices and the training of officers in their use.

32. Use of hearing protection devices

I recommend that the NSWPF evaluate whether the use of noise-attenuation devices should be mandated when explosive distraction devices are used.

33. Review of alternative ammunition

I recommend that the NSWPF undertake a formal assessment of alternatives to the TOU's current soft-point ammunition to determine whether a more appropriate form of ammunition is reasonably available.

34. Family liaison

I recommend that the NSWPF develop a comprehensive policy and set of procedures in relation to family liaison capability for high-risk situations. Those policies and procedures should ensure that:

??? The capability is scalable depending on the nature of the incident.

??? An appropriately senior officer is responsible for overseeing the liaison process. He or she should have direct access to officers in the Police Forward Command Post for the purpose of conveying and receiving information in a timely manner.

??? A dedicated family liaison officer (or officers) is assigned to the family of each victim and given responsibility for managing the needs of that family.

??? Officers are given guidance on communicating with families, including the appropriate frequency and content of briefings both during and after an incident.

??? Officers are advised of the proper process for gathering and disseminating intelligence from family members.

35. Casualty identification and death notice delivery

I recommend that the NSWPF review its policies, procedures and training to ensure the rapid identification of persons killed or injured in high-risk situations. Those policies should provide appropriate guidance on how and when death messages ought to be conveyed following such incidents.

36. ADF call-out arrangements

I recommend that the ADF Review confer with state and territory governments about the criteria governing applications for the ADF to be called out pursuant to the Defence Act 1903 (Cth) with a view to determining:

??? whether further guidance is required on the criteria to be used by states and territories in determining whether to apply for Commonwealth assistance; and

??? if so, what criteria ought to be stipulated.

37. Consistency between ANZCTC protocols and the Defence Act

I recommend that the ADF Review give consideration to amending the Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee protocols to ensure that they provide sufficient guidance as to the respective roles of the ADF and state police tactical groups. Such guidance should accord with the legislative framework in Part IIIAAA of the Defence Act 1903 (Cth).

38. Procedures for obtaining ADF assistance

I recommend that the ADF Review, in consultation with the police forces of the states and territories, examine the guidance available to ADF officers and state and territory police regarding:

??? the role of ADF liaison officers;

??? the availability of ADF assistance in the absence of a call-out; and

??? the procedures to apply in relation to requests for, and the provision of, equipment or advice by the ADF.

39. Review of information-sharing arrangements

I recommend that the Commonwealth AttorneyGeneral, in consultation with states and territories, review existing arrangements for information sharing between federal, state and territory agencies during terrorist events to determine whether those arrangements (and the guidance provided to officers in respect of them) adequately facilitate the efficient identification and transfer of pertinent information between agencies.

40. Correspondence referral

I recommend that the Commonwealth Attorney-General liaise with ASIO to develop a policy to ensure that where correspondence is received by a government agency, minister or public office holder, from a non government entity, and that correspondence is relevant to the security assessments of the author, the correspondence be referred to:

??? ASIO; and

??? a Fixated Threat Assessment Centre.

41. Review of Australian Psychological Society's disclosure rules

I recommend that:

??? the Commonwealth Attorney-General and ASIO confer with the Australian Psychological Society regarding the restrictions in clause A 5 2 of the Code of Ethics (2007) with respect to radicalisation, terrorism and politically motivated violence; and

??? the Australian Psychological Society consider amending clause A 5 2 of the Code of Ethics (2007) to enable psychologists to report risks of a terrorist nature.

42. Privacy legislation review

I recommend that the Premier of New South Wales consider whether the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 and the Health Records and Information Privacy Act 2002 should be amended to ensure that there is appropriate access to health related information available to ASIO (consistent with recommendation 12 of the report of the Martin Place Siege Joint Commonwealth-New South Wales review).

43. A Fixated Threat Assessment Centre

I recommend that the NSWPF, in conjunction with NSW Health, establish a Fixated Threat Assessment Centre to identify and gather information about fixated persons, assess the risks they pose, and attempt to mitigate such risks through early intervention.

44. Liaison with ASIO

I recommend that ASIO liaise with the Fixated Threat Assessment Centre with a view to both agencies cooperating in the identification, assessment and management of fixated, radicalised individuals.

45. The LECC to coordinate critical-incident debriefs

I recommend that the Minister for Police undertake a review of the Law Enforcement Conduct Commission Act 2016 with a view to enabling the Law Enforcement Conduct Commission to facilitate urgent debriefs and confidential internal reviews of critical incidents focused on improving current practice.